Case Update: Long Say Ting Daniel v Merukh Nunik Elizabeth

Long Say Ting Daniel v Merukh Nunik Elizabeth (personal representative of the estate of Merukh Jusuf, deceased) (Motor-Way Credit Pte Ltd, intervener) [2013] 1 SLR 1428; [2012] SGHC 250. Section 391 of the Companies Act does not apply to proceedings commenced by persons other than the company.

  1. The High Court in this case interpreted section 391 of the Companies Act, which sets out the Court’s power to grant relief from liability where, among others, a director believes that any claim will or might be made against him in respect of any negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust.
  2. Section 391 applies to officers of a company, persons employed by a company as auditors, experts within the meaning of the Companies Act, and persons who are receivers, receivers and managers or liquidators (section 391(3) of the Companies Act)]
  3. The Court had to determine whether section 391 of the Act only applies to proceedings commenced by the company, and not by any other persons. The Court held in the affirmative, i.e. that section 391 of the Act does not apply to proceedings commenced by persons other than the company (at [56]).
  4. Background: the estate of the plaintiff’s deceased co-director threatened to take legal action against the plaintiff (either by the Company or qua the estate as a third party) for breach of director duties in selling several properties belonging to the company.
  5. The Court held (at [66], [68]) on the facts that the plaintiff was entitled to relief under section 391 against proceedings by the Company only as he had not been deceitful or unreasonable. However, this was not applicable to potential proceedings by third parties.
  6. Significance: this decision makes clear that relief under section 391 of the Companies Act is a narrow one and does not protect the applicant from proceedings by third parties. It is however unclear what effect a judgment granting relief under section 391 would have on proceedings commenced by third parties. It is likely that a favourable judgment would at the very least dissuade third parties from commencing proceedings since the court would already have deemed the applicant to have been acting honestly and reasonably.

Civil Dialogue as Procedure, Process and Point in being Salt & Light in the Public Square: Giving Worth to the Imago Dei

publicsquare

The essence of relations between people is communication. In March 2015 I wrote can article on how civil dialogue should be the procedure, process and point for Christians living as salt and light of the world in the public square, such a paradigm being grounded in and motivated by a respect for the imago dei in every person. The main points to this are as follows:

1. Civil dialogue is conversation between persons in a way which respects every participant and which seeks understanding.

2. The public square is thus the space freely accessible to the local community in which the life of the community occurs–where members of the community dialogue, and where truth and wisdom ought to prevail for justice and righteousness to flourish.

3. We can be salt and light in or with the public square:

  • Public square is a platform to love neighbours by presenting the Christian worldview.
  • Public square is a platform to love neighbours and love ourselves by shaping public matters informed by God’s loving truth, bearing in mind the individual and societal impact of presenting our Christian worldview in the public square.
  • Public square is a platform for loving neighbours in deed.Civil dialogue should be our procedure, process and point.

4. The ethics of dialogue is just as important as the subject matter of the dialogue.

Check out the full article here.

Case Update: Ang Thiam Swee v Low Hian Chor [2013] SGCA 11

Ang Thiam Swee v Low Hian Chor [2013] SGCA 11commencement of statutory derivative action – good faith requirement.[1]

 

The Court of Appeal clarified and articulated several principles on the good faith requirement (under section 216A(3)(b) of the Companies Act) in respect of commencing statutory derivative actions under section 216A of the Companies Act.

 

The Court of Appeal clarified that while the motivations of the applicant should be assessed, it is not the motivations per se that constitute bad faith; instead, bad faith will only be established where the applicant’s motivations amounted to a personal purpose (where the applicant’s judgment becomes “clouded by purely personal considerations”) which indicated that the company’s interest would not be served: at [12]-[17].

 

There is no presumption that every party with a reasonable and legitimate claim was acting in good faith. Instead, the onus was upon the applicant to demonstrate that he was or may be genuinely aggrieved. (At [18]-[23]). (This overturned existing Singapore case law which stated that there was a presumption.)

 

Drawing from Canadian and Australian jurisprudence, the Court of Appeal applied a test for good faith which looked at (at [24]-[31]):

  • whether the applicant had an honest belief in the merits of the proposed derivative action; and
  • whether the applicant’s collateral purpose is sufficiently consistent with the purpose of doing justice to a company such that he is not abusing the statute, amounting to abuse of process, or abusing the company as a vehicle for his own personal interests.

 

Further, considerations of legal merit should not be factored into the assessment of good faith and may more appropriately be dealt with under s 216A(3)(c), which looked to the prima facie interests of the company (at [58]).

[1] See also Supreme Court Note- Ang Thiam Swee v Low Hian Chor [2013] SGCA 11 (s 216A of the Companies Act) Supreme Court Note, Supreme Court, Mar 2013 (1).

Work Injury Compensation Act compensation limits increase Jan 2016

Singapore Law; Legal; Lawyer

Work Injury Compensation Act (WICA) compensation limits 

The Ministry of Manpower (MOM) recently announced on 5 October 2015[1] that from 1 January 2016, the maximum and minimum WICA compensation limits for death, permanent incapacity and medical expenses will be increased as follows:

Existing Limit New Limit
Death Minimum $57,000 $69,000
  Maximum $170,000 $204,000
Permanent incapacity Minimum $73,000 $88,000
  Maximum $218,000 $262,000
Medical expenses Up to $30,000 or 1 year from date of injury, whichever reached earlier Up to $36,000 or 1 year from date of injury, whichever reached earlier

Additionally, treatments that facilitate early return to work will be claimable as part of WICA medical expenses. This would cover charges for physiotherapy and occupational and speech therapy, case management, psychotherapy, functional capacity evaluation and worksite assessment for purposes of rehabilitating an injured employee back to work, and the cost of medicines and artificial limbs and surgical appliances.

[1] See Work Injury Compensation Act (Amendment of Third Schedule) Order 2015; Third Schedule of the Work Injury Compensation Act.

earth waiting

In the year when little rain fell
and the wind brought burnt wood instead,
grass fields were parched into barren deserts;
elderly trees searched deep for life;

the earth kept waiting to be made good –
the earth kept waiting for good.

A Discursive on Writing

A Discursive on Writing 

Here I, as a follower of Jesus Christ, reflect on writing in general.

Writing is Expression of What is Within

I begin with the idea of the overflow of the heart and the eye as the lamp (or gateway) of the body. “The good person out of the good treasure of his heart produces good, and the evil person out of his evil treasure produces evil, for out of the abundance (overflow) of the heart his mouth speaks.” Luke 6:45 (also Matt 12:34) (ESV).

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Case Update: SAAG Oilfield Engineering (S) Pte Ltd v Shaik Abu Bakar bin Abdul Sukol and another and another appeal [2012] 2 SLR 189 – contingent creditors under scheme of arrangement

SAAG Oilfield Engineering (S) Pte Ltd (formerly known as Derrick Services Singapore Pte Ltd) v Shaik Abu Bakar bin Abdul Sukol and another and another appeal [2012] 2 SLR 189; [2012] SGCA 7whether workmen who have tortious claims against a company (contingent creditors) are creditors under a scheme of arrangement.

Two workmen suffered injuries in industrial accidents in the course of their employment under a company (Derrick Services), which was later bought over by SAAG, and initially lodged claims under the then Workmen’s Compensation Act (“WCA”). The company was subject to a Scheme of Arrangement. The two workmen did not attend the creditors’ meeting and did not submit any proof of debt to the Scheme administrators. After the Scheme had terminated, the workmen withdrew their WCA claims and commenced common law tort actions against SAAG. SAAG applied to the High Court to determine whether these tort actions had been extinguished by the implementation of the Scheme.

The High Court held that the workers’ tortious claims were not extinguished by the Scheme as they did not participate in the Scheme and their claims were covered by insurance policy which the former company, Derrick Services, and SAAG had in respect of the workmen’s claims. SAAG appealed, so their tortious liability would be effectively borne by the insurer.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and held that the workmen (who were contingent creditors) were deemed creditors for the purposes of section 210 of the Companies Act and specifically for the purposes of the Scheme.

The fact that the workmen’s claims were covered by insurance (or guarantee or indemnity) made no difference to the analysis of whether the workmen were creditors (at [47]).

The Court thought that it would render section 210 (which provides for Schemes of Arrangement) pointless if tort claimants, who may form a substantial class of a company’s creditors, are excluded from a Scheme (at [48]).

Where claims against a company have not been agreed, it is usual to allow creditors to vote for the amounts for which they estimate that the company is liable to them, subject to reasonableness. Where there is serious doubt over the existence and/or size of a tort claimant’s unliquidated claim, and if such a claim is critical to determining whether there is the requisite majority for the Scheme to be executed, then the creditors’ meeting should be adjourned and the matter be decided by the courts: at [49].

The Court followed the English decision of Re Midland Coal, Coke, and Iron Co, Re [1895] 1 Ch 267 and held that creditors include contingent creditors whose claims could be admitted to proof in a winding up, even if it was for an unproven, unliquidated amount (at [33], [50]).

The Court then held that the workmen were Scheme Creditors under the definition of the Scheme (based on contractual interpretation) because SAAG was liable to them, notwithstanding that they were indemnified against that liability by virtue of the insurance policy (at [57]).

It was not open for a creditor (who was intended to be bound by the Scheme) to argue that he was not bound because he did not consent to or participate in the Scheme and thus did not receive any payouts, because a Scheme was a statutory contract and was not subject to common law requirements of contractual formation, e.g. need for consideration etc: at [61]-[62].

The workmen were therefore bound by the terms of the Scheme and therefore precluded from maintaining their common law claims against SAAG: at [63].

There would be no injustice in this case because the workmen still had recourse to their WCA claims as the WCA claims were under the terms of the Scheme: at [65]-[66].

However, this was merely fortuitous. In future cases, tort claimants who were not aware of and/or did not participate in a Scheme could find their claims entirely barred without their knowledge: at [67].

Thus, the Court stated several guidelines adopted from the Australian decision of R L Child & Co Pty Ltd (1986) 10 ACLR 673 so that such a wide interpretation of ‘creditors’ taken would not cause injustice (at [68]):

A responsible officer of the company proposing the scheme should provide evidence that the company has received no notice of any pecuniary claim against it and it is not aware of any circumstances likely to give rise to a pecuniary claim against the company other than what was disclosed to the court.

The courts should be slow to approve a scheme which would have the effect of barring a potential claim with no effective notice of the scheme given to the potential claimant and where this can be avoided without frustrating the commercial purpose of the scheme.

It would be appropriate to qualify the definition of a creditor in a scheme of arrangement to exclude any person having a claim in respect of which the company is entitled to indemnity under a policy of insurance, to the extent of the amount recoverable under such policy in respect of such claim.

Significance: entities who act as Scheme Managers should advise the company in respect of the above guidelines laid down by the SGCA in relation to contingent creditors vis-a-vis a Scheme.

Case Update: The Royal Bank of Scotland NV v TT International Ltd [2012] 4 SLR 1182; [2012] SGCA 53 – disclosure of professional fee arrangements to scheme creditors and the court

The Royal Bank of Scotland NV (formerly known as ABN Amro Bank NV) and others v TT International Ltd and another appeal [2012] 4 SLR 1182; [2012] SGCA 53disclosure of professional fee arrangements to scheme creditors and the court

Significance: entities who act as Scheme Managers should take note of the duties and principles involved in implementing a Scheme as laid down by the SGCA in both judgments of RBS v TT International; the breach of duties may result in the Scheme being set aside and costs of the Scheme manager being forfeited.

  1. The company entered into an agreement with an entity owned by the scheme manager of the Scheme of Arrangement where the company was to pay the entity a success-based fee for professional services rendered upon successful implementation of the Scheme. However, this agreement was not disclosed to the scheme creditors and to the Court prior to the sanction of the Scheme.
  1. The Court of Appeal in this decision held that the agreement should have been disclosed so that scheme creditors could make an informed decision on whether to support the Scheme given the potentially large amount involved that could affect their financial interests: at [23].
  1. The Court held that a company to be subject to a Scheme had an obligation to disclose all material information to the scheme creditors, including contingent liabilities, and not use the device of ‘excluded creditors’ in a Scheme to keep actual or contingent liabilities hidden from other creditors: at [20]-[23].
  1. The Scheme Manager likewise had an obligation to act in good faith to the scheme creditors and not mislead or suppress material information from them. He also has an obligation to not place himself in conflict of interest; where there is conflict, informed consent of the scheme creditors is required: at [25]-[27].
  1. The Court emphasised the need for companies proposing schemes of arrangement and proposed scheme managers to be mindful of the interests of the creditors in discharging their duties, and to have “transparency … be the guiding principle of all corporate actions when creditors’ interests are affected, as is the case in a scheme of arrangement”: at [28]-[32], [37].
  1. Generally, where there is a breach of duty to disclose material information by the company and the Scheme Manager, it would result in the Scheme being set aside and put to a fresh vote; the Scheme Manager would also have been deprived of his costs: at [33], [36].
  1. On the facts of this case, however, the Court decided not to set aside the Scheme because it had already been implemented for more than two (2) years and it was not practical to set it aside without causing more harm to the company and the creditors; instead, the parties are directed to reach an agreement on the appropriate amount of professional fees awarded for the Scheme Manager: at [33]-[34].
  1. The Court further stated as obiter that “a commercial practice [in this case of the Scheme Managers disclosing success-based fee arrangements to scheme creditors or to the courts], no matter how widespread, does not have the force of law by dint of accident of vintage or absence of protest if it is contrary to legal principle”: at [14].

Resurrection Sunday and the Ultimate Reality

Resurrection Sunday and the Ultimate Reality

(8 April 2012, Easter 2012)

Resurrection Sunday (Easter) is the celebration of the focal point of the ultimate reality.

In the beginning was the Word, the Word was God, and the Word was with God.

Jesus is the Word. The revelation of heaven intersecting earth, spirit and material in one being and eternity in history.

He came to display a glimpse of the ultimate reality in splendour and with spectacle.

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